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ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
Comment on Recent Decisions
CRIMINAL. PROCEDURE-CUMULATIVE SENTENCES-POWER OF CouRTs.-The
defendant was arraigned on five informations for robbery by means of a
deadly weapon, and pleaded guilty to them all. The cases were conducted
as one case. The record in each case shows only a sentence of fifty years
imprisonment, without further specification. Held, the sentences are to run
cumulatively. State v. Harris (Mo. 1935) 81 S. W. (2nd) 319.
The crux of the matter is the construction of R. S. Mo. (1929) 4456,
which reads as follows: When any person shall be convicted of two or more
offenses, before sentence shall have been pronounced upon him for either
offense, the imprisonment to which he shall be sentenced upon the second
or other subsequent conviction shall commence at the termination of the
term of imprisonment to which he shall be adjudged upon prior conviction.
The Court approves the decision in State ex rel. v. Breuer, (1924), 304
Mo. 381, 264 S. W. 1, which clearly repudiates the reasoning of Ex parte
Myers, (1869), 44 Mo. 279, and all cases holding similarly. But the facts
in the case at hand do not warrant absolute reliance on precedent, and the
court wisely relies on the statute itself as the basis of its conclusion.
In the Myers case, the defendant had been convicted and was serving his
sentence when an effort was made to prosecute him upon a new, entirely
different indictment. The Court held that the judicial power to impose sen-
tence rested solely upon statutory authority, and the section quoted did not
furnish a basis for assessing a punishment to run subsequent to one on
which the defendant was at the time imprisoned.
The Breuer case goes into a full and complete discussion of the power
of the state to impose sentences, and after a long and careful review of
early English and American cases, especially New York cases involving the
act on which the Missouri statute was modeled, reached the conclusion that
judicial authority in the matter does not rest solely upon legislative enact-
ment, and therefore, that the statute in question, although it limits the
court to cumulative sentences in the circumstances set forth, leaves the
residue of judicial authority unimpaired. 10 St. L. L. Rev. 149. Such seems
to be the established rule at the present time. State ex rel. v. Rudolph.
(Sup. Ct. Mo., 1929), 17 S. W. (2nd) 932; State v. Williams, (Sup. Ct. Mo.,
1928), 6 S. W. (2nd) 915. In the Breuer case, the second prosecution, with
which the Supreme Court refused to interfere by writ of prohibition was
based upon a charge instituted at a time when the defendant was before
an appellate court, seeking reversal of a prior conviction.
Clearly, the principal case involves a factual background entirely dis-
tinct from the other cases. There, the question presented was whether the
statute limited the court in the imposition of cumulative sentences to the
described circumstances. Here, the facts plainly bring the case within the
scope of the statute, and the question is one of application only.
A point of appellate procedure also is involved in this case, the Supreme
Court deciding that it had the power to enter the proper directions for the
disposition of the cumulative sentences. Although the case was remanded on
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other grounds, the Court's dictum is completely contrary to the usual Mis-
souri piactice of remanding every criminal case involving error or omission,
the higher court assuming no power to do what the trial court should have
done originally. Even in cases of the sort discussed here, despite R. S. Mo.
(1929) 3765, giving the Supreme Court power to correct judgments erro-
neous as to time or place of imprisonment, the general practice has been to
send the record back to the trial court, there to be amended to conform to
the construction of the statute as laid down by the Supreme Court. State v.
McFadden, (1925) 309 Mo. 112, 274 S. W. 354. If the dictum in the prin-
cipal case is followed in future opinions, the Missouri courts will have
abandoned the traditional attitude of the past, and be embarked upon the
more rational and progressive tendency apparent in modern opinions on
criminal procedure.
W. H. M., '36
DOWER-EMINENT DOMAIN-EQUITABLE CoNvERSIoN-REcoNvERsIoN.-
The city of New York condemned a portion of appellant's property and
awarded him $53,258. His wife, claiming dower, filed notice of a lien on
one-third of the award and this sum was set aside to her. The husband
appealed. Held, in a 3 to 2 decision, that the inchoate right of dower is
not such an interest in land taken by eminent domain as to entitle the wife
to have a part of the award set aside for her benefit in case she survives
her husband. Inr e Cropsey Avenue, in City of New York (1935) 278 N. Y.
Supp. 815.
The instant case is of special significance because it is a direct reversal
of the New York policy expressed in Matter of N. Y. and Brooklyn Bridge
(1894) 75 Hun. 558, 27 N. Y. Supp. 597 and Simar v. Canady (1873) 53
N. Y. 298. The case accepts the view stated in Moore v. Mayor (1853)
8 N. Y. 110. The attempt of the court in the principal case to distinguish
the case at bar from that of the Brooklyn Bridge case is futile and uncon-
vincing.
All authorities agree that when land is taken by the right of eminent
domain, it is not necessary to make the wife a party to the proceeding, as
her inchoate dower is inferior to the right of the state to take land for
public purposes, and when it is so taken the inchoate dower is extinguished.
Venable v. Wabash Western R. Co. (1893) 112 Mo. 103, 20 S. W. 493;
1 Nichols, Eminent Domain (2nd ed. 1917) sec. 12; 1 Washburn, Real Prop-
erty (5th ed. 1887) pp. 577-582. There is conflict, however, as to whether
the wife is entitled to share in the proceeds of the award. The question has
been adjudicated in but a comparatively few jurisdictions the majority of
which hold that she has no right to share in the award. Moore v. Mayor,
supra; (dicta) Venable v. RR Co., supra; Flynn v. Flynn (1898) 171 Mass.
312, 50 N. E. 650, 42 L. R. A. 98; McCullough v. St. Edwards Electric Co.
(1917) 101 Neb. 802, 165 N. W. 157; Long v. Long (1919) 99 Ohio St. 330.
124 N. E. 151, 5 A. L. R. 1343; Salvatore v. Fuscellaro (R. I. 1933) 166
Atl. 26, and the principal case. New Jersey is in the vanguard for the
minority holding which maintains that the inchoate right of dower attaches
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